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ABSTRACT: While corporate income taxation is a major issue in the 
debate over international ﬁnance, economic theory has no clear stance 
on who bears its burden. On balance, economists seem still more prone 
to accept that taxing proﬁts does not affect corporations’ outcomes. This 
paper makes three cases for non-neutrality. First, since corporate income 
taxation is asymmetric between proﬁt and loss, the tax rate may change 
the ranking of alternative investments. Secondly, the imperfect observ-
ability of the use of internal resources makes pure economic proﬁts very 
difﬁcult to detect. Thirdly, when the pervasive role of entrepreneurship 
is fully taken into account, corporate income taxation appears clearly as a 
direct tax on market adjustments and successful speculation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In 2007, top marginal corporate income tax rates among the member countries of the European Union ranged from a low 
of 10 percent (Bulgaria and Cyprus) to a high of 38.36 percent 
(germany), with Italy closely following with a rate of 37.25 
percent. In the world list of top corporate taxing countries, 
Japan scores ﬁrst with a rate of 40.7 percent, followed by US and 
germany, with the average level of corporate taxes in the EU 
declining from 38 percent in 1993 to 24.2 percent in 2007 (KPMg, 
2007). This trend toward decrease,1 which is not limited to the 
EU, is mainly due to the com petition between countries to attract 
and keep foreign investment: as of 2007, Moldova has set to zero 
the tax rate on corporate income.2 With regard to the US, in 2007 
corporate tax revenues represented approximately 14 percent of 
federal government revenues,3 or 3.9 percent of gross domestic 
product. The total value of the corporate income tax amounted 
to $53,378,874.
Table 1. Corporate Income Tax Rates (1987–2007), OECD Countries
1987 1997 2007
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
49.0
55.0
43.0
51.6
-
50.0
51.5
45.0
60.0
36.0
34.0
40.2
44.6
39.0
34.0
28.0
41.7
56.8
30.0
25.0
34.0
33.5
21.0
25.0
26.0
34.4
30.2
1 See Table 1 for an international comparison.
2  Fiscal competition seems to be a source of concern for scholars at the IMF, which 
invokes ﬁscal coordination to stop corporate income taxes from falling further 
(Piatkowski and Jarmuzek 2008).
3 See Figure 1 for more data on US revenues from corporate income taxation.
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1987 1997 2007
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Korea
Luxembourg
Mexico
49.0
n.a.
n.a.
50.0
46.4
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
40.6
35.0
18.0
n.a.
36.0
53.2
50.0
n.a.
n.a.
34.0
25.0
20.0
15.0
12.5
27.5
39.5
27.5
30.4
28.0
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Slovak Republic
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
42.0
48.0
50.8
n.a.
48.1
-
35.0
56.6
31.7
35.0
33.0
28.0
38.0
37.4
40.0
35.0
28.0
28.5
25.5
30.0
28.0
19.0
26.5
19.0
30.0
28.0
21.2
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
n.a.
35.0
44.2
n.a.
31.0
39.5
20.0
28.0
39.3
Source: The Tax Foundation, 2008.
Fig 1. U.S. Corporate Income Tax Revenues / Total Tax Revenues 
(1967–2007)
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Corporate income taxes are levied on the net income earned by 
corporate ﬁrms, i.e., on proﬁt. Since proﬁt is calculated subtracting 
the sum of all costs from the sum of all revenues, it is not clear 
what effect this tax exerts on a ﬁrm’s factor and product markets. 
Which stakeholders does the tax impact more heavily? Work ers? 
Stockholders? Customers? It comes as no surprise that economic 
literature has not delivered any neat result about who pays 
corporate taxes, yet. In the stan dard textbook exposition, the 
incidence of this kind of taxes is rarely explored in detail and the 
most common result reported is that taxing proﬁts does not change 
the production choices, independently of market structure. In the 
stream of more technically oriented literature, Krzyzaniak and 
Musgrave (1963) maintain that corporate taxation can be shifted 
backward or forward, due to market structure. Using a competitive 
general equilibrium model, Harberger (1962) proves that the tax 
is fully passed backward to capital owners. Feldstein, green, and 
Sheshinski (1979) demonstrate that backward shifting is impossible 
in the case of a perfectly elastic capital supply. The implications 
of corporate taxation for the allocation of ﬁnancial resources are 
somewhat clearer. In the effort to reduce their tax obligations, 
corporations generally are induced to use debt rather than equity 
ﬁ nance, for interest payments to bondholders are deductible 
from taxable income, while dividend payments to corporate 
shareholders are not: in this perspective, Auerbach (2005) provides 
evidence that this substitution results in signiﬁcantly higher debt/
equity ratios. Furthermore, distributed dividends are often taxed 
twice: the ﬁrst time as net income produced by the ﬁrm, the second 
time as part of personal income. 
The aim of this paper is to show that the case for corporate tax 
neutrality does not hold as a general rule. To prove this result, 
section 2 reviews the traditional neoclassical model used to 
demonstrate that corporate taxes do not impact a ﬁrm’s decisions. 
This result holds true only to a very limited extent, since it ignores 
risk and alternative investment choices. Section 3 reviews three 
main reasons why the effects of taxing proﬁts may be far from 
neutral. First, under very general conditions, corporate taxes 
may change the ranking of alter native investment choices, even 
though the distribution of stochastic outcomes is fully known to 
the entrepreneur. Secondly, since current taxation procedures rely 
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on objective book values, pure entrepreneurial activities, which 
cannot read ily be assessed from those sources, become depressed in 
favor of deductible mon etary costs. Thirdly, the Austrian approach 
marks a drastic departure from the neoclassical paradigm, for it 
assumes entrepreneurship as the essence of ﬁrm’s activities: in this 
framework of intrinsically uncertain knowledge, taxing corpo-
rations reduces market efﬁciency, equilibrium adjustment, and 
long-run growth of wages. 
2. THE CASE OF NEUTRALITY
The standard public ﬁnance literature (Ulbrich 2003; Cullis and 
Jones 1998; Musgrave and Musgrave 1989) treats the problem of 
corporate taxation focusing exclusively on the highly stylized model 
of the neoclassical ﬁrm, whose only control variable is the size of 
production.4 For a neoclassical ﬁrm, the objective function is: 
where q  is the size of production, π  is proﬁt, p(q)  is 
the inverse demand curve, and c(q)  is the total cost function, 
including wages, other variable costs, interest paid, and capital 
depreciation. Under the assumption of differentiability with regard 
to c and p, maximization of π requires
(1) 
at the optimal size q*, the marginal revenue from selling q* units 
of product must equal the marginal cost needed to produce them. 
4  An exception to this way of presenting corporate taxation is provided by Holcombe 
(2005) and Stiglitz (2000). Holcombe states clearly that 
Strictly speaking, corporations do not pay income tax. The corporate income 
tax is ultimately borne by individuals, and saying the corporation pays the 
tax amounts to saying that the corporation’s stockholders bear the burden of 
taxation (Holcombe 2005, p. 313). 
Salin (1985) also elaborates on this point.
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In this context, corporate income taxation turns the proﬁt 
function into  
where [0,1] is the tax rate. No matter what the value of , 
optimality condition (1) continues to hold, since both sides of the 
equation are affected by the tax rate in the same proportion. Econom-
ically relevant resources are not diverted away from their current 
uses: simply, government collects revenues equal to (q*). The 
incidence analysis is straightforward: What is changing here is just 
income distribution—a net transfer from stockholders to government 
bureaucrats—but the total wealth available to society is unaffected, 
since q*  does not depend on . 
To investigate whether the tax impacts the long-run equilibrium 
of a given sector, we must make further assumptions on market 
structure. This is what we assume: (1) all sectors are taxed at the 
same rate and (2) the sector under study is perfectly competitive. It 
follows that in the long run the following relation must hold also:
In other words, the long-run price, endogenously determined 
by exits and entries of ﬁrms, would be large enough to just cover 
average costs, thus driving proﬁts to zero, as well as revenues 
from corporate taxes. This result corroborates what was previously 
obtained in the case of short run: corporate tax is completely neutral 
with regard to quantity determination and also to the number of 
ﬁrms operating in a given sector. Even though the total collected 
revenues for the government grow linearly with the ﬁrm’s total 
proﬁt, the effect of corporate taxation is exactly the same as a 
lump-sum tax. 
3. THE CASE OF NON-NEUTRALITY
The previous model of ﬁscal incidence leaves no room for 
allocational effects of corporate taxation. This extreme result was 
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obtained under the assumptions of perfect knowledge of selling 
price, and no risk over costs and revenues. As soon as we depart 
from this scenario, tax neutrality invariably disappears. Whether 
we introduce risk, imperfect observation of proﬁts, or actual 
entrepreneurship made possible by genuine uncertainty, market 
distortions invariably arise. 
rIsk
Consider the following scenario. A risk-neutral entrepreneur can 
choose between two alternative risky investments, namely a and b, 
which assume values xi , with i {a, b} and a known cumu-
lative distribution function of probability F(xi) = Pr{t ≤ xi}, with 
t (−∞, ∞). The expected value of both investments is assumed 
to be strictly greater than zero. To simplify matters, assume that 
no variable production cost is involved by any project.
given all this, the expected return of the i-th investment is 
Provided entrepreneur’s neutrality toward risk, we have
i.e., only expected returns matter to him. Now, assume that 
proﬁts are taxed with a constant rate [0,1] if and only if their 
realized value is greater than zero. In this case the expected return 
of the ith investment becomes 
Other things being equal, then, the introduction of corporate tax 
decreases the expected return in the case of success. We are ready 
to demonstrate the following: 
106 The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 13, No. 1 (2010)
Theorem 1: When positive proﬁts are taxed, the value of  changes the 
relative proﬁ tability of mutually exclusive investments. 
Proof: Since positive proﬁts are taxed, investment a is chosen in 
place of b when 
(2) 
 
Without loss of generality, assume that the difference on left side 
of the inequality is strictly greater than zero. That is to say that
 (3) 
as long as the term on the right side is negative, the inequality is 
preserved no matter what the value of . On the contrary, when the 
term on the right side is positive, the inequality holds as long as 
(4) 
Naming  the value of  for which the previous inequality holds 
as an equality, it follows immediately that when ≥  then the b 
investment shows a higher expected value than a, even though the 
expected value without taxes of a is higher than b’s. The ranking of 
proﬁts from alternative investments is thus affected by . 
Example 1: Consider two investment projects such that their prob-
abilities of success are pa = 0.5 e pb = 0.64 with returns equal to  = 
200 and  = −10 for the a project and  = 180 and  = −50 for the b 
project. The expected return of the a project is 95, whereas the expected 
return of the b project is 97.2. It follows that b should be the chosen one. 
However, when the corporate tax rate is  > 0.14, then the a project is 
chosen instead. 
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From the previous theorem it is straightforward to prove 
the following: 
Corollary 1: Assume that the entrepreneur must pay a fraction  of the 
proﬁts in case of success, while receiving a unitary subsidy equal to  in 
case of failure. Then, the choice between mutually exclusive investments 
does not depend on the values of  or  only when  = . 
Proof: Introducing loss subsidy, condition (2) becomes 
(5) 
because of the linear property of the expected value. This expression 
is indepen dent of tax and subsidy rates only when  = . In this case, 
the comparison between the proﬁtability of alternative investment 
projects is restored to the case of no taxation and the ranking between 
them is unaffected. Now, the ﬁscal policy of the government is 
completely neutral with regard to the investment choice. 
Example 2: Consider the former example: the expected return before 
taxes for the a project was 95, while for the b project was 97.2. With  = 
0.2 the expected return after taxes of the a project is 75, the return of the 
b project is 74.16, so that a is chosen. With a unitary loss subsidy  = 
0.2, the return of the a project becomes 76 and the return of the b project 
becomes 77.76, so that b is chosen: the original ranking of proﬁtability is 
then restored. 
In very general terms, corporate taxes do modify entrepreneurial 
choices,5 unless the government subsidizes losses using a unitary 
5  Assuming that the utility function deﬁned over the set of returns is decreasing in 
the risk and that the same function has the expected utility property, i.e., 
 
where p is the probability of success, with x1 > 0 and x2 < 0, the same results 
obtained in the case of linearity also hold true.
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rate of the same value. Only in this case, therefore, corporate tax 
is made neutral. When  <  the loss subsidy functions like an 
insurance. When  = 1 the insurance is complete, with the risk being 
completely transferred to the government (Domar and Musgrave, 
1944). Also, the result that corporate income taxation can reduce the 
demand for risky assets is robust to alternative scenarios. Adding 
the assumption of risk aversion, Stiglitz (1969) obtains a critical  
which induces the entrepreneur to change his decisions.6
earnIngs and profIT
A more realistic perspective on the incidence of corporate tax 
must necessarily take into account how the tax is determined and 
administered. Following Lon gobardi (2005) we make a distinction 
between earnings and economic proﬁt. 
Deﬁnition 1 (Earnings): Earnings are the difference between revenues 
and costs de ﬁned on the ﬁscal year. It is equal to 
(6) 
where R are total revenues, weLe are total paid wages, reKe is the 
rental cost of capital, C is the value of intermediate goods, and A is 
capital depreciation. 
Deﬁnition 2 (Proﬁt): Proﬁt is what the entrepreneur receives once all 
factors of production are paid at the opportunity cost. It is equal to 
(7) 
where wpLp is the implicit salary obtained by the entrepreneur and rpKp 
is the opportunity cost of the capital owned by the ﬁrm. 
It is a matter of fact that corporate taxes are almost universally 
based on earnings because the economic costs wpLp + rpKp cannot be 
readily obtained by stan dard bookkeeping procedures. Provided 
6  For an extensive account of the dynamic incidence of corporate income taxation, 
see Pantegh ini (2007).
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that u ≥ π, it follows that the usual techniques of corporate taxation 
based on observation of earnings systematically overestimate the 
economic proﬁt obtained by the entrepreneurs. Furthermore, 
this kind of taxation creates a distortion in the use of resources. 
To see why, consider the case of a ﬁrm operating in a perfectly 
competitive market in which earnings are taxed. The proﬁt 
function of this ﬁrm is
where we have made the following substitutions: w = we = wp , r 
= re = rp , F = C + A. From the inspection of ﬁrst order conditions for 
the maximization of π with regard to internal resources we have
under the assumption of decreasing returns to internal capital 
and entreprene urial work, the optimal employment of these two 
factors must decline in response to corporate taxation based on 
earnings.7 Also in this case, taxing proﬁts is far from neutral, since 
it implies the substitution of internal capital with external capital 
and substitution of entrepreneurial activities with labor. 
The ausTrIan approaCh
Why do standard neoclassical economics textbooks keep 
repeating the irrelevant case of neutrality of the corporate income 
taxation? This kind of error is anything but accidental and dates 
back to the Ricardian vice, which is the intellectual attitude to 
build economic models based on peculiar circumstances and then 
improperly ex tending their implications to contexts in which the 
same circumstances are not assured to hold, then resulting in false 
predictions. Austrian economic theory, on the contrary, is consis-
tently grounded in the philosophy of human action immersed in 
a world of subjective value, imperfect knowledge, and genuine 
un certainty. Its results are assured to be valid, independent of any 
7 This result is consistent with the ones obtained by Harberger (1964).
110 The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 13, No. 1 (2010)
empirical test ing. The implications of praxeology for the theory 
of taxation are far-reaching and overturn many of the neoclassical 
conclusions, including those on corporate income taxation. 
WhaT’s Wrong WITh TaxaTIon 
Jean Baptiste de Say, the most prominent antecedent of the 
Austrian school (Say 2001 [1803], book III, chap. VIII), was the ﬁrst 
economist to recognize that tax ation can never be considered as 
a part of an implicitly voluntary exchange be tween citizens and 
government, since it is always based on coercion. This implies 
diversion of resources from productive uses, often resulting in 
wasteful bureau cratic expenditures (Brandly, 2007). 
While there is virtually no elaboration on the issue of taxation 
in Carl Men ger’s Principles, in Mises’s Human Action the whole 
issue is given an exceptionally brief treatment (Mises, 1998 
[1949], pp. 730–35) in the chapter Interference by Taxation. He 
recognizes that the case of neutral taxation is a chimera in real 
eco nomic life and adds that, in practice, politicians try to minimize 
neutrality since they do want to interfere with individual choices 
to achieve income redistribu tion. The chapter offers little but a 
warning that excessive taxation can under mine the functioning 
of the market mechanism. Nowhere it can be found the basic 
praxeological deduction that any coerced transaction must 
always involve a decrease in the utility of at least one participant 
of the trade. In Mises, as in the old Austrian tradition,8 taxation 
is not a subject of analysis in itself since it is al ways analyzed in 
close connection with the issue of public expenditure: the main 
concern of the Austrian scholars seemed to be the burden of the 
public sector, which must be kept at a minimum, with taxation 
following passively.9
8  In his Social Economics, Wieser (1927 [1914]) treats the State as an exception to the 
general laws of voluntary trade and marginal utility. He makes the assumption 
of a benevolent utilitarian State which maximizes collective utility; nonetheless, 
Wieser warns the public sector against progressive taxation, since it can alter the 
historically sanctioned equilibrium of society. The same view is also expressed in 
Natural Value (Wieser, 1893).
9  Friedrich von Hayek, also formerly a student of Wieser, did not tackle directly the 
analysis of taxation in his technical papers and books. In an imaginative article, 
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Contrary to his Austrian antecedents, Murray N. Rothbard 
wrote exten sively on taxation both at the academic10 and at the 
non-technical level.11 To date, the most comprehensive technical 
treatise on public ﬁnance in the Austrian tradition endorsing 
consistently the praxeological methodology12 is his Power and 
Market (Rothbard, 2004b), originally an outgrowth of the ﬁnal 
chapter of his magnum opus Man, Economy, and State about non-
voluntary exchange. Roth bard’s contribution encompasses and 
extends previous Austrian insights on the nature of taxation, 
framing them in the context of binary intervention–namely, 
the direct coercion of the State against the individual. These 
arguments debunk the neoclassical wisdom on taxation and build 
upon two basic principles worth a systematic presentation. 
Principle 1 Every tax worsens consumers’ satisfaction. 
The basic premise of praxeology is that human beings decide 
to trade with each other when the subjective-discounted-expected 
value of what they get is higher than the forgone value of what 
they agree to give up in exchange. When these human beings are 
not coerced by physical violence or by its threat, the trade beneﬁts 
all the participants involved. Conversely, any coerced trade must 
result in a loss to at least one participant. Taxation is the proto-
typical case in which this violation occurs, since it is the ultimate 
threat of imprisonment which convinces citizens not to resist tax 
collectors. It follows that taxation must beneﬁt the tax consumer 
and penalize the tax payer. 
Spicer (1995) tries to ﬁgure out what kind of taxation would ﬁt the Hayekian 
vision of the State. He maintains that neutrality, predictability, and nondiscrimi-
nation would be desirable features of an optimal Hayekian tax sys tem. Spicer also 
maintains that Hayek’s writings may be interpreted as providing a warning against 
radical changes in taxation policy, whatever the objectives of such radical changes might 
be (p. 106). Needless to say, the classical liberal view on the subject is diametrically 
opposed to this kind of arguments which praise the status quo for its own sake, no 
matter how wrong it may be.
10  See Rothbard (1981). The discussion that follows is broadly based on this funda-
mental contri bution.
11 For example, see the chapter Fiscal Mysteries Revealed in Rothbard (1995).
12  In the Austrian tradition, Walter Block (1989) has provided solid confutations to 
the more up-to-date apologetics toward taxation and State intervention.
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In the current literature on public ﬁnance, this ﬁrst principle 
is hidden be hind the supposedly voluntary theory of the State 
(Buchanan 1973). In their standard presentation of public ﬁnance 
textbooks, neoclassical economists ﬁrst start arguing that the 
market cannot provide public goods because of nonrivalrous 
consumption and non-excludability, then demonstrate that 
ﬁnancing their pro duction is subject to the inescapable problem of 
free riding, and ﬁnally maintain that taxation is the natural way to 
have these public goods come into being. Even though the concept 
of deadweight loss—the aggregate value of the trade which does 
not take place because of taxation—has become a key ingredient in 
the eco nomic analysis of taxation (Musgrave and Musgrave 1989), 
neoclassical utilitarian economists never compare the potential 
gain provided by the provision of public goods against the dead-
weight loss that comes from ﬁnancing them through taxation. In 
practice, compulsory taxation is a non sequitur from the theory of 
public goods, even from a utilitarian perspective. 
Austrians advance two objections to the above paradigm. First, 
the govern mental cost-beneﬁt analysis contradicts the basic truth 
that value is a subjective phenomenon: Individual utilities cannot 
be observed from an external point of view, so it is pointless to 
use any aggregate measure of them. Secondly, it is in consistent to 
maintain that a free market is permanently incapable of providing 
goods for which the demand is higher than supply. Entrepreneurs 
are a vital part of any market: they are the agents who coordinate 
its functioning, reduce disequilibrium, and discover new ways to 
overcome technological difﬁculties like non-excludability or non-
rivalrous consumption, for by acting in this way they can col lect 
proﬁts. Substituting private activity with government intervention 
implies the breakup of the process of entrepreneurial discovery, 
resulting in the destruc tion of potential markets. 
Principle 2 There is no independence between production and distri-
bution, viz., there cannot be such a thing as a neutral tax. 
John Stuart Mill (1909 [1887]) neatly distinguished between the 
problem of pro duction and the problem of distribution, the former 
solved by the market, the latter to be solved by the State. In Mill’s 
work there was no relation between them, since he envisioned 
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a world with flexible property rights13 and no forward-looking 
behavior. Mill’s socialist world is made up of rational agents who 
do not pay attention to the income collected through mutual trade 
and voluntarily give up to the State—through taxation—the power 
to distribute it according to some ethical rule. This confusion 
continued with neoclassical economics: within the boundaries 
of an artiﬁcial economy, it is possible to design neutral taxes, i.e., 
taxes which purely transfer resources from the private sector to the 
government, with out changing the relative prices of goods. This 
merely intellectual experiment is no problem per se, but becomes 
highly misleading when its implications are applied to the real 
world or enforced by law. 
Praxeology, on the contrary, is based on the a priori statement 
that the me chanics of human action is based on the comparison 
between expected beneﬁts and expected costs, all of them lying in 
an uncertain future. The legal system determines to a large extent 
what can be included in these sets, so it is senseless to include a 
future discounted stream of income if this is going to be taxed 
away. Taken to the extreme, only very myopic individuals would 
indulge in any work when their wage is completely absorbed by 
tax collectors. Moreover, the problem of distribution is not inherent 
to the free-market, rather being an outcome of State coercion that 
creates a separate distribution process not depending on the 
voluntary exchange of property rights.14
The former two basic principles are applied to the analytical 
study of taxa tion. The main ﬁnding of Rothbard’s analysis about 
ﬁscal incidence is that taxes cannot be shifted forward. The question 
of incidence is about who really pays taxes: even though the law 
is clear on which subjects a tax is levied upon, these subjects 
adjust their behavior, spreading the effect of the tax over a variety 
of goods and ser vices. Praxeology explicitly acknowledges that 
13  John Stuart Mill viewed property rights, no less than political institutions, as 
creatures of “time, place and circumstance,” to be assessed and altered to harmonize 
with “the perma nent interests of man as a progressive being” (gray, 1979).
14  Economists have long tried to design a neutral tax in a way that resembles a market 
price (Rothbard 2004a, pp. 919–27) in order to minimize its distortive effects, but the 
general principles of taxing according to the beneﬁt received or to equal sacriﬁce can 
never produce a compulsory trade which is economically equivalent to a voluntary 
one. The very concept of voluntary taxation is an oxymoron.
114 The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 13, No. 1 (2010)
economic action never happens in a vacuum and that margins of 
substitution are everywhere. However, some kinds of adjustments 
are plausible, whereas others are not. One fallacy of the stan dard 
neoclassical theory of incidence is the shifting of taxation. According 
to this view, a sales tax, but also a corporate income tax, can be 
shifted onto customers simply increasing selling prices, resulting 
in an adjustment that leaves the seller’s situation unaltered. 
The Austrian theory of value is based solely on marginal utility, 
so production costs cannot directly push market prices.15 If the 
seller had margins before taxes to raise selling prices, he would 
have surely done that before the tax is levied: a tax cannot provide 
the incentive to ﬁnd a new optimum. Nonetheless, the tax does 
affect the ﬁrm’s budget: while inframarginal ﬁrms can afford to 
pay it, some marginal ﬁrms which just break even before the tax 
will be driven out of the market. This results in a decrease of the 
supply of the taxed good: if the demand schedules have remained 
unaltered throughout the whole process of adjustment, the selling 
price must go up. In sum, the shift in the market supply is not due 
to a change in the structure of marginal costs, but to the departure 
of ﬁrms from the market. In the long run, the decreased number of 
ﬁrms impacts on the demand for productive factors, resulting in 
diminished prices. Ultimately, backward shifting is the only kind of 
indirect incidence which is consistent with the Austrian view. 
WhaT’s Wrong WITh CorporaTe InCome TaxaTIon 
The most radical critique of the supposed neutrality of corporate 
income taxa tion comes from the Austrian school of economics. 
Compared to its neoclassical opponent, Austrian economics 
endorses a different view on the nature and the role of economic 
proﬁt: this view encompasses a fully entrepreneurial concept of 
the ﬁrm. The idea of entrepreneurship is all but new in the history 
of eco nomic theory: since the very beginning of the economic 
science,16 economists have realized that entrepreneurship is not 
an accidental qualiﬁcation of a ﬁrm’s life, rather lying at its very 
15  The same objection can be put forward regarding theories of cost-push inflation 
based on the mark-up theory of price formation.
16 The two classical references are Cantillon (1755) and Say (2001 [1803]).
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core. Unfortunately, no economist from the clas sical school ever 
focused on the entrepreneurial function (Blaug 1997, p. 442) and the 
whole stream of classical economics virtually omits the analysis of 
dy namic action taken by real individuals. Furthermore, neoclassical 
economics, with its strong emphasis on perfect knowledge and 
mathematical maximization procedures, leaves no room for 
entrepreneurial activities which, by their own na ture, rely more on 
creating new knowledge rather than using existing knowledge. True, 
a world without entrepreneurship would look like the idealized 
Walrasian prototype, and no action would ever be taken. 
As pertains to this paper, one of the key differences between 
the neoclassicals and the Austrians is the concept of proﬁt. In the 
neoclassical model of perfect competition, pure economic proﬁts 
can exist only in the short run be cause of a small number of ﬁrms 
operating in a given sector. In the long run, the flow of new ﬁrms 
into the sector increases aggregate supply, driving down market 
prices and proﬁts. Neoclassical entrepreneurs simply coordinate 
produc tive factors according to a fully known array of technologies 
and market prices of productive factors and ﬁnal products. genuine 
uncertainty plays no role what soever. 
The Austrian entrepreneur is radically different. The real world 
studied by economics is made of entrepreneurs who freely decide 
whether and how to trade, comparing expected discounted beneﬁts 
to costs. These values are subjectively perceived and naturally 
give raise to different opinions and evaluations. It is precisely 
this variety of opinions regarding the future that makes some 
individuals succeed and others fail. Those who anticipate future 
prices correctly earn posi tive proﬁts. They speculated that some 
productive factors are underpriced when compared to the potential 
products they can contribute to: ex post, these entre preneurs ﬁnd 
they were right because they ﬁnd themselves in the position of 
collecting income from customers in the form of positive proﬁts. 
Net economic proﬁt is not the payment for any productive factor. 
Factors of production are always paid in advance: their monetary 
payment is exchanged for the use of scarce resources and is never 
conditional upon the success of the ﬁrm. Provided that capital is 
a factor of production, it follows that proﬁt cannot be considered 
as a return on invested capital. Proﬁt is a different source of 
income, since the kind of uncertainty faced by the entrepreneur 
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is intrinsically unpre dictable and no probability function can be 
used to describe the problem, for the space of possible events is 
only partially known. If the average return of an entre preneurial 
activity were stable and known in advance, then that activity 
would soon become a part of the management routine and others 
entrepreneurs would follow in pursuing the same strategy. As soon 
as a proﬁtable idea becomes com mon knowledge, it does not bring 
proﬁtable results any longer. Proﬁt is simply the result of specu-
lation, which can turn out to be positive or negative. A pos itive 
proﬁt indicates a disequilibrium in expectations—maladjustment, 
in Mises’s terminology—which is in the process of being corrected: 
once the adjustment has taken place completely, proﬁts disappear. 
Entrepreneurship is not a kind of sys tematic search for proﬁt, since 
any systematic pattern of behavior is predictable and leads ulti-
mately to zero proﬁts. In a free market, positive proﬁt means that 
entrepreneurs are taking advantage of the possibility of serving 
customers’ wants. Without this fundamental signal, the free market 
would collapse immediately be cause the entrepreneurs’ choices 
could not be matched with signiﬁcant real data. 
Austrians agree that markets adjust continuously to modiﬁcations 
in prefer ences, technologies, and resource availabilities: it is the 
very function of prices to move so to reflect the underlying pattern 
of individual heterogeneity (Hayek 1980 [1948]). This process of 
constant change creates new proﬁt opportunities which can be 
grasped only by active entrepreneurs, not by passive neoclassi cal 
technocrats. Nevertheless, some additional features of entrepre-
neurship are debated among the Austrians. The presentation of 
entrepreneurship given in the former paragraphs dates back to 
Mises (1962) and is endorsed by Rothbard. Kirzner (1997) takes 
the issue of individual alertness to the extreme, deriving a theory 
in which entrepreneurial activity is not related to uncertainty. 
The Kirznerian entrepreneur grabs proﬁt opportunities which are 
completely certain (Rothbard 1997). According to this deﬁnition, 
an entrepreneur cannot ever be observed in the making: only 
ex post, given the positive result of the action, we can be certain 
that the individual was acting entrepreneurially. Otherwise, if 
we could observe the entrepreneurial action at work, we should 
always concede that every action faces uncertainty and there is no 
guarantee that any individual will actually attain his objectives. 
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The standard marginal analysis cannot be properly applied in the 
Kirznerian framework and entrepreneurship cannot be considered 
a scarce resource (Kirzner 1991, p. 316). Put in these terms, economic 
analysis is almost useless in exploring how incentives may affect 
entrepreneurship.17
What is the role played by corporate taxation in the Austrian 
context of un certainty? Answering to this question requires a 
clear stand on the nature of en trepreneurship. If one embraces 
Kirzner’s radical approach, no incentive scheme can be applied: 
proﬁt taxation simply decreases the return from alertness, but 
since alertness is an effortless activity, the tax cannot modify 
its level. Only a 100 percent corporate income tax could make 
an entrepreneur indifferent between be ing alert or not. Surely, 
Kirzner recognizes that price ceilings and regulations do hamper 
the functioning of entrepreneurship since they lower the value of 
poten tial proﬁt opportunities, but his argument cannot be validly 
extended to the issue of corporate income taxation, because the 
proﬁt tax is levied on the outcome of successful speculation, 
independently of the source of the same proﬁt. Paradox ically, the 
Kirznerian entrepreneur would be unaffected by a proﬁt tax, just 
like in the extreme neoclassical case: he would continue to be alert 
toward proﬁtable opportunities, even though he would collect less 
income from them than other wise. This would happen since the 
entrepreneur does not face an opportunity cost for his action, so 
that proﬁt taxation cannot induce any substitution toward alter-
native actions: corporate income tax would work as a lump-sum 
tax on entre preneurs.18
17  In a somewhat obscure paragraph promisingly titled The Incentive for Entrepre-
neurial Dis covery, Kirzner (1997, pp. 316–19) states that in order to “switch on” the 
alertness of a potential discoverer to socially signiﬁcant opportunities, they must offer 
gain to the potential discoverer himself. This hint, however, does not go beyond an 
alternative verbal formulation of the concept of proﬁt opportunity and is useless 
to characterize incentives to entrepreneurship in the real world.
18  In his contribution speciﬁcally focused on corporate income taxation, Kirzner 
(1976) seems to suggest that taxing pure proﬁts may induce entrepreneurs to leave 
some proﬁt opportunities unexploited. This happens because taxation reduces 
the private gain from alertness. This line of reasoning does not ﬁt the paradigm 
of Kirznerian entrepreneurship, since it implies a conscious decision on whether 
to use the mental faculty of alertness, a decision based on a balance between its 
expected returns and an opportunity cost which must be greater than zero. This 
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A workable alternative in the Austrian framework is the classical 
Misesian-Rothbardian vision, previously described.19 There the 
entrepreneur faces the uncertainty that is inherent to the whole set 
of contracts that constitute a ﬁrm, bearing the cost and the beneﬁt 
of his choice. He receives a positive proﬁt that is the payoff from 
serving at t1 a potential consumer demand that was not certain at 
t0. In this context, taxing corporations’ proﬁt has two main effects: 
(1) it decreases the incentive to engage in entrepreneurship and (2) 
changes the way entrepreneurs deal with proﬁts and losses. 
The ﬁrst effect depends on the margins of substitution between 
entreprene urial action and other kinds of action. When these 
margins do exist, corporate taxation changes the marginal rate 
of substitution between them. Plausible candi dates for non-
entrepreneurial action are routine tasks and subordinate jobs, 
which imply a lower degree of risk-taking. Contrary to the 
Shackle-Lachmann vision of price formation, the Mises-Rothbard 
approach emphasizes the possibility of individual rational calcu-
lation and the existence of a well-deﬁned array of equi librium 
prices, notwithstanding the impossibility of attaining or observing 
them in the real world. Equilibrating forces tend to drive market 
prices toward equilib rium, with entrepreneurship being the most 
important of these forces. When the proﬁt tax rate is large enough, 
individuals ﬁnd it convenient to engage more in routine tasks 
and less in innovation, speculation, forecasting: accordingly, the 
economy’s growth rate and capital accumulation decline. 
The second effect depends on the margins of substitution 
between the ways in which entrepreneurial action takes place. 
When the black box of entrepreneur ship is open to investigation, 
it is found that the set of actions aimed at reducing losses does not 
overlap completely with set of actions aimed at gaining positive 
proﬁts. given the asymmetric ﬁscal treatment of proﬁts and losses, 
possibility is explicitly ruled out by his concept of entrepreneurship as expressed 
in his classical exposition (Kirzner, 1973).
19  Schumpeter (1982 [1911]) also advanced a theory of entrepreneurship which 
is consistent with some of the main features of the Mises-Rothbard view. Even 
though he decidedly departed from the Austrian paradigm of subjectivism, 
endorsing a Walrasian view of the economy, he described the entrepreneur as the 
economic agent who continuously plays a destabilizing role in the price system, for 
the beneﬁt of introducing technical and commercial innovations.
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the corporate income tax induces entrepreneurs to focus more on 
ﬁnding ways to escape losses than on ways to collect proﬁts. 
Both effects impact negatively on consumers’ utility. Market 
adjustment re quires time to take place completely, since entre-
preneurs create new knowledge in the process. With corporate 
income taxation, market prices adjust to equilibrium values 
more slowly, because some individuals tend to engage less in 
entreprene urial activities, and entrepreneurs tend to act more to 
protect themselves from losses than to look for new opportunities. 
As a result, the economy becomes less flexible, in creasingly static, 
and more sensitive to external shocks. The incidence of the tax is on 
the entrepreneur and the ﬁnal customer: the former cannot collect 
money from his speculation about the future, the latter is deprived 
of new consumption opportunities. Moreover, in a dynamic setting, 
if the potential entrepreneurial act calls for expanding the use of 
paid work and capital, then the prospective worker and the seller 
of capital goods are also penalized by the tax. 
To sum up, since proﬁt taxation operates only when proﬁts are 
positive, talented entrepreneurs are discouraged from engaging 
in satisfying consumers’ wants. This kind of taxation, working 
as a penalty on successful entrepreneurial action, bears a strong 
resemblance to antitrust policies aimed at picking the winners of the 
competitive process, like those preventing and punishing mergers 
and acquisitions. Corporate income taxation and antitrust policies 
share the common static view of proﬁts as depending solely on 
market structure. They systematically downplay the role of uncer-
tainty and the unpredictability of market evolution. Furthermore, 
both taxation and antitrust law provide asymmetrical incentives. 
Taxation is levied on realized proﬁts, but does not subsidize losses. 
In the same fashion, antitrust law imposes direct monetary costs 
on the temporary winners of the market process, but does not 
provide direct monetary beneﬁts to the tem porary losers of the 
same process. The effect of both interventions, however, is aimed 
at inverting the order of the market process.20
20  Antitrust law and corporate taxation have a common inspiration in anti-market 
ethics. In particular, taxing proﬁts is supposed to equilibrate income distribution 
toward paid work. Mises (1998) contends that taxing proﬁts can permanently 
shift the balance between capital and labor. Since, in the long run, corporate 
taxation decreases the level of capital accumulation in the economy, the marginal 
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4. CONCLUSION
The growing awareness that low corporate tax rates are crucial to 
attract foreign investments has not been translated in a consistent 
set of analytical results, yet. Most of the literature on the incidence 
of corporate tax either relies on patently unrealistic assumptions 
about investment possibilities or neglects the key role played by 
entrepreneurs. Likely, the apparent lack of well-established results 
in this ﬁeld is mainly due to the missing link of entrepreneurship, 
an issue which is almost ab sent or downplayed in the neoclassical 
theory of the ﬁrm. However, the Austrian paradigm can be fruitfully 
applied to the analysis of corporate income taxation because it 
includes a more realistic account of the causal connection between 
un certainty and proﬁt. The addition of the entrepreneurial element 
suggests that the distortions induced by taxing corporations may 
be countless and the dynamic ef fects on capital formation, wages, 
and market adjustments may impose severe costs. Despite the 
efforts of governments to introduce harmonization among na tional 
ﬁscal legislation,21 competition is (luckily) constantly improving 
the world econ omy.
productivity of labor cannot grow, and so cannot wages. Consequently, the only 
real source for the enrichment of the labor class is severely damaged. This perverse 
effect works against the intention of the political parties which support corporate 
taxation on the ground that capitalists and workers ﬁght over the distribution of a 
cake of given size. This unintentional effect on salaries and wages is less apparent 
than other distortions, but probably lies among the most severe ones.
21  For a clear assessment of the irrationality of ﬁscal harmonization, see Salin (1988).
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